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Recent Developments
in Conflicts of Laws
Michael M. Martin
of the New York City Bar

"Restatement 2d, Conflicts" refers to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS (ALI, Philadelphia, 1971).
A. Introduction
1. Ordinarily, practicing lawyers and judges will do almost anything to avoid conflicts issues, but there have been some developments in this area in recent years that are important to
the practicing bar and the bench.
a. The first of these has been a change in choice-of-law
methodology in many states.
i. This change in methodology has increased the opportunities for the forum to apply its own law, and that has,
of course, increased the incentives for forum shopping.
b. The second development is really a nondevelopment the Supreme Court has been unwilling to control this forum shopping by controlling the way states make choiceof-law decisions.
i. Finally, however, the Court has imposed some indirect
controls on forum shopping through restrictions on jurisdiction and venue.
B. Changes in Choice of Law
1. Changes in the choice-of-law process have been significant, if
not revolutionary, over the past 30 years. Traditionally, courts
© 1985 Michael M. Martin
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used a set of rules that prescribed which states' laws were
applicable generally according to the type of case. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS passim (ALI, Philadelphia,
1934).
a. Thus in a tort case the law of the place of the wrong applied. In a contract case the law of the place where the
contract was made was used. When the problem was the
ownership or use of real property, the law of the place
where the land was located applied; and so on.
b. In the past three decades, these rules have been replaced
or supplemented in many states by new methodologies or
approaches. Two characteristics principally distinguish the
modern approaches from the traditional rules they replace.
i. First, the modern approaches resolve conflicts issue-byissue, instead of by choosing one state's law to govern all
the substantive issues in the case. See, e.g., Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 58, 59-60 (1973). For example, in the

Chicago DC-10 litigation, one state's law was applied to
the issue of punitive damages and another's to the measurement of compensatory damages. See In re Air Crash
Disasternear Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981). See also
Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 504 F. Supp. 514
(N.D. Cal. 1980).
ii. One practical consequence of this issue-by-issue approach is that, when faced with a multistate case, the lawyer should not just send an associate off to do a memo on
"whose law applies to this case." Rather, the efficient course
is to determine, first, whether there are any differences
among the states regarding essential issues and then, only if
there are, which state's law will apply on each issue.
iii. Besides deciding on an issue-by-issue rather than a
case-by-case basis, the other major change under the modern approaches is that they explicitly or implicitly consider
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the results for the parties of selecting one state's law or
another's. But see Restatement 2d, Conflicts §§145, 188.
(which, by stating presumptive rules, appear to be
jurisdiction-selecting, although reference in each to policies stated in section 6 is consistent with the modern
trend).
iv. The traditional rules just pointed to one jurisdiction or
the other and applied its law regardless of that law's content. The law of the place of the wrong would be applied
without considering whether it would favor the plaintiff
or defendant. Under the modern approaches, by contrast,
it is appropriate to consider which party will benefit,
either because that bears on how each state's interests in
the case will be affected or because it points to the "better
law." See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
198-200, 210-22, (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 3d ed.,
1977).
2. The modern approaches developed out of a recognition that
the traditional rules frequently led to results that were unfair
- or if not unfair, they were at least irrational in the sense of
not advancing the purposes of the laws being applied. See,
e.g., Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in
Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958).
a. But with the "better" results available today has also come
greater uncertainty - if not uncertainty that one state
will reach the same result on the facts as another, at least
the psychological uncertainty for the lawyer when first
approaching the case as to what methodology will be used
and what result is likely to derive therefrom.
i. One should note two things here: first, the certainty of
the traditional approach was somewhat illusory, since that
system too could be manipulated. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON,
D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 75-126 (3d ed.,
West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn. 1981), illustrating and discussing the traditional use of characterization to manipulate the results.
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ii. Second, under modern approaches the uncertainty varies. It may be pronounced in tort and contract cases, but
land cases still tend to be governed by the law of the situs.
Compare R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW chs. 1314 (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 3d ed. 1977) with id. ch.
16.
C. An Illustration of the Modem Methodologies
1. The full horror of modern choice of law can be seen in the
litigation following the American Airlines DC-10 crash at
Chicago in May 1979. In re Air Crash Disasternear Chicago,
Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981), is the principal conflicts opinion, dealing with punitive damages.
a. The lower court decision on the issue is reported at 500 F.
Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1980); the issue of prejudgment interest is considered at 480 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
aff'd, 644 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1981).
i. In this mass disaster litigation 118 wrongful death
actions, commenced in five states and Puerto Rico, were
consolidated for pretrial purposes in the federal district
court in Chicago.
b. Under the rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612
(1964), the court was required to apply the different
choice-of-law approaches of the districts from which the
cases were transferred. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
c. The case thus provides a good illustration of modern
choice-of-law methodology in theory and practice. A summary describing the parties and some essential features of
the litigation follows.
i. The plaintiffs (personal representatives) in the Air
Crash Disaster case are, and their decedents were, residents of California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
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Vermont, Puerto Rico, Japan, the Netherlands, and Saudi
Arabia. The residences of the beneficiaries are not stated.
Some of those jurisdictions allow punitive damages in
wrongful death actions; some do not.
ii. The defendants are American Airlines and McDonnell
Douglas Corporation. American Airlines is incorporated
in Delaware, has its principal place of business - its
headquarters - in New York, moved within three months
of the crash to Texas, and has its maintenance base in
Oklahoma, where its planes are serviced. It is unknown
whether Delaware has a punitive damages rule; New York
does not allow recovery for punitive damages, whereas
Texas and Oklahoma allow recovery.
iii. McDonnell Douglas is incorporated in Maryland, has
its principal place of business in Missouri, and has its DC10 plant in California, where its planes are designed and
manufactured. It is unknown whether Maryland has a punitive damages rule; Missouri allows recovery for punitive
damages, whereas California denies recovery.
iv. The fatal flight was scheduled to fly from Chicago to
Los Angeles; many of the tickets were bought in Chicago.
The crash occurred in Illinois, which denies punitive damages.
d. With regard to transferor districts:
i. Illinois' state courts follow the "most significant relationship" approach of Restatement 2d, Conflicts;
ii. California follows the "comparative impairment" approach; no choice-of-law approach is discerned in Hawaii;
iii. Michigan's trial court said the "interest analysis"
should be used, whereas its court of appeal said that the
"place of the wrong" was weakening in favor of the "most
significant relationship" test;
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iv. The New York trial court said the "interest analysis"
should be used, whereas its court of appeal said the "most
significant relationship" is preferable; and
v. Puerto Rico follows the traditional "place of wrong"
approach.
e. A critical conflicts issue in the case was the availability of
punitive damages.
i. The district court concluded that all the approaches led
to the disallowance of punitive damages against American, but some permitted punitive damage claims against
McDonnell Douglas. The court of appeals found that all
approaches precluded punitive damages claims against
both defendants.
ii. For cases commenced in Puerto Rico, the choice of law
was relatively easy. Puerto Rico applies the traditional
place-of-wrong rule. Jimenez Puig v. Avis Rent-A-Car
Sys., 574 F.2d 37, 40 (1st -Cir. 1978). No public policy
exception was applicable, since both Puerto Rico and Illinois, the place of wrong, would deny punitive damages.
Therefore, the court barred punitive damages claims in
the Puerto Rico cases. In re Air Crash Disaster,644 F.2d at
630 (7th Cir. 1981).
iii. For cases commenced in Hawaii, there was some difficulty, since neither the parties nor either of the courts
were able to identify that state's choice-of-law rules. The
court of appeals resolved this difficulty by presuming that
the forum would apply its own local law. Id. at 630-31. It
thus followed the Restatement 2d, Conflicts §136, comment h and Ninth Circuit practice with Hawaii cases. See,
e.g., Commercial Ins. Co. v. Pacific-Peru Constr. Corp.,
558 F.2d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1977).
f. Both courts agreed that Illinois would follow the "most
significant relationship" approach of the Restatement 2d,
Conflicts. 500 F. Supp. at 1048; 644 F.2d at 611. This
approach presumes the application of the law of the state
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of injury unless another state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence or the parties. Ingersoll v.
Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 48, 262 N.E.2d 593, 596 (1970); Restatement 2d, Conflicts §§146 (personal injuries), 175
(wrongful death). Determining the state of the most significant relationship involves, first, determining the location of certain contacts, which for torts include the
following:
i. The place of the injury;
ii. The place of the misconduct;
iii. The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and
iv. The place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered. Restatement 2d, Conflicts §145(2).
g. Those contacts are then evaluated for their relative importance to the particular issue, and in light of such general
criteria as protecting justified expectations, advancing relevant policies of the forum and other states, and promoting certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result.
Restatement 2d, Conflicts §6(2).
2. In deciding which state had the most significant contacts
with the punitive damages issue, the Seventh Circuit determined that the plaintiff's or decedent's domicile was not very
important because punitive damages rules are concerned
with the defendants.
a. A state that denies punitive damages does so to protect the
defendants against excessive liability; a state that permits
them does so to deter certain conduct by the defendants the extent of its concern for its plaintiffs is defined by its
compensatory damages rules. 644 F.2d at 612.
b. In any event, both the state of departure and the destination had the same rule disallowing punitive damages. Id.
at 612, 616.
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The most significant contacts, in the court's view, were
where the defendant had acted and where it had its principal place of business. For both American and McDonnell Douglas, however, one of those states allowed
punitive damages and the other denied them.
i.

ii. Thus, Missouri, where McDonnell Douglas is headquartered, seeks to deter wrongful conduct by corporations acting or controlled from there by allowing punitive
damages. California, where McDonnell Douglas designed
and built the plane, seeks to encourage that activity
within the state by protecting manufacturers from the imposition of punitive damages. See id. at 613-14. See also
id. at 617-21 (the same approach applied to American,
complicated by the transfer of the corporate headquarters
from New York to Texas about the time of the crash).
iii. Since neither contact was deemed more significant,
the court resolved the impasse by looking to the place of
the accident. See id. at 614-15 (rejecting the district
court's choice of the headquarters state, even though that
would make responsibility for corporation's conduct uniform). 500 F. Supp. at 1049-50.
iv. The place of the accident is concerned with airline
safety, which it could promote by imposing punitive damages, and with airline activity, which it could encourage
by denying them. 644 F.2d at 615-16, 620-21.
v. Since Illinois had chosen the latter course, the balance
was thrown against the punitive damages claims in the
cases from Illinois.
vi. The court noted that this resolution was not intended
to signal a return to the law of the place of wrong. Rather,
when all other factors are equal, using the place of the
injury provides an easily applied and principled means of
decision; it also promotes certainty and uniformity of
result. Id. at 616, 621.
c. For the cases coming from California, the court applied a
"comparative impairment" approach. Offshore Rental
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Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721,
148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978); Bernhard v. Harrah'sClub, 16
Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
i. The first step in this approach is to determine whether a
"true conflict" exists. A "true conflict" is more than a difference in possibly applicable laws. In "interest analysis" it
is a term of art meaning that the interests or policies of one
state cannot be promoted without impairing the interests
or policies of another. See, e.g., Currie, Married Women's
Contracts, supra, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. at 259 (1958).
ii. For example, Oklahoma has a policy of encouraging
care in aircraft maintenance by imposing punitive damages against those whose conduct is faulty. If that policy
were to be implemented by imposing punitive damages
against American Airlines, New York's policy of protecting
companies with headquarters there against excessive liability would necessarily be impaired.
iii. Likewise, an application of New York's law to this case
would promote its policy but necessarily impair Oklahoma's.
iv. With such a true conflict, the second step of the California approach is to try to determine which state's policy
would be more impaired if its law were not applied. This
inquiry focuses on two factors: first, the current status of
the rule and the intensity with which it is applied; and
second, the "fit" between the rule and the particular situation.
v. As far as the Seventh Circuit was concerned, this "comparative impairment" inquiry did not help to resolve the
problem. The rule of neither the state in which the conduct occurred nor the state in which the defendant was
headquartered was archaic, each rule had been strongly
reaffirmed in recent years, and each squarely fit the situation. Id. at 622-25, 626-28.
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vi. Again, the court resolved the equipoise between interested states by tossing Illinois into the balance. As the state
of the accident, it was interested in discouraging faulty
conduct and encouraging airline activity. Its rule subordinated the former policy to the latter, so punitive damages
were denied against both defendants in the California
cases, too. Id. at 625-26, 628.
d. With the cases coming from Michigan and New York, the
question was more which method applied than how to
apply it.
The trial court had said that Michigan followed "interest analysis" - which is, essentially, the first step in the
California approach. 500 F. Supp. at 1052.
.

ii. The court of appeals said lex locus (the law of the place
of the wrong) was Michigan's basic rule, but that it might
be weakening in favor of a "most significant relationship"
approach. 644 F.2d at 630.
iii. A third reading of the cases is that Michigan has an
expanding "public policy" exception to lex locus, which
presages a modern approach, but it has not yet chosen any
particular one. In any event, all the approaches would
lead to a denial of punitive damages.
iv. Similarly, for New York the trial court said interest
analysis was the state's choice-of-law approach. 500 F.
Supp. at 1051. The court of appeals, relying on the same
New York opinion, Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), said the focus
was essentially on "most significant contacts." 644 F.2d at
628-29. Compare id. at 629 n. 44 (a discussion of a postBabcock case focused on interests).
e. Although the DC-10 court ended up applying the same
law to both defendants no matter what the approach, that
is no guarantee that the commentators who developed the
approaches or the respective state courts that apply them
would. In fact, if were it not for the fact that all the trans-
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feror states appear to deny punitive damages in death
cases, that unanimity would be very surprising.
i. The Seventh Circuit's opinion might be seen as a conscious attempt to conform to Professor Leflar's description: "Essentially, [the various approaches] are consistent
with each other. Any one of them is likely to produce
about the same result on a given set of facts as will another." R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 218 (BobbsMerrill, Indianapolis, 3d ed. 1977), quoted in 644 F.2d at
610.
D. Forum-Preference under the Modem Approaches
1. The previous comment that all the transferor states in the
DC-10 case would probably reach the same result because
they all deny punitive damages in death cases adverts to a
common characteristic of all the modern approaches.
a. No matter how the approach is characterized, each requires that the court applying it consider the interests of
the respective states. Whenever a state has some contact
with the litigation or the parties, it is relatively easy to say
that it has an interest in determining the result.
i. Thus, if each state can find an interest in applying its
own law and if each has the same substantive law, it is
likely that all will reach the same result.
2. Strictly speaking, a state has an "interest" in a conflicts case
only if application of its domestic rule-of-law will promote or
impair the purposes of that rule.
a. Thus, in the classic Babcock case, Ontario has no interest
in the application of its guest statute to a suit between a
New York passenger and her New York driver. Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482-83, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1963).
i. This is true because the purpose of the guest statute to protect Ontario insurers against collusion between host
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and guest - would not be advanced by applying Ontario
law nor would it be impaired by applying New York law.
b. Many courts, however, use the word "interests" more
loosely, to indicate some general concern of the state.
i. For example, in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302 (1981), the forum was seen as having an interest in its
resident plaintiff recovering, even though she could in no
sense be seen as an intended beneficiary of the statute under consideration.
c. In any event, it is usually possible to make a credible argument that the forum has interests in the case - even if for
no other reason that the fact that the forum must have
''minimum contacts" with the defendant to have personal
jurisdiction.
i. If one can frequently articulate a forum interest in the
case and if the forum is then likely to apply its own law, it
is easy to see why the selection of the forum can be so
important.
E. Limitations on Forum-Shopping
1. Query: What stops this forum-shopping from getting out of
control? It certainly is not the Supreme Court regulating the
choice-of-law process. The decision in Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), strongly suggests that the Court
is unwilling to limit a state's application of its own law except
in the most egregious instances.
a. Hague grew out of the death of a Wisconsin resident who
worked in Minnesota. He was killed in a Wisconsin motorcycle-accident caused by an uninsured motorist. After his
death his widow moved to Minnesota. There, she brought
a declaratory judgment action against Allstate, claiming
that the uninsured motorist coverage in his three Wisconsin automobile insurance policies should be "stacked," or
cumulated, pursuant to Minnesota law.
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i. Under Wisconsin law, she was apparently entitled only
to a single coverage, of $15,000, instead of "stacked" coverage totalling $45,000.
ii. The Minnesota courts applied Minnesota law to the
case. They noted that each state had interests - Wisconsin in holding down insurance premiums and Minnesota in
compensating a Minnesota resident - but resolved the
conflict by applying the "better law," which was, of
course, Minnesota's. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289
N.W.2d 43, 47, 49 (Minn. 1979), aff'd, 449 U.S. 302
(1981).
b. The Supreme Court upheld the application of Minnesota
law, five to three, with Justice Stevens concurring in the
result. The plurality and the dissent seemed to agree on
the test to be applied under the due process and full faith
and credit clauses. As Justice Brennan put it for the plurality:
[F]or a state's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice
of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. 449 U.S. at
312-13.

c. See id. at 336 (Powell, J., dissenting). The plurality identified three Minnesota contacts in the case, which, together, satisfied the test:
i. The decedent's membership in the Minnesota workforce;
ii. Allstate's doing business in Minnesota; and
iii. The Minnesota residence of the plaintiff, who was the
policy beneficiary. Id. at 313-19.
d. The reason for -saying that the Court has virtually abdicated direct control over the choice-of-law process was
pointed out by the dissenters: except possibly for Allstate's
doing business in Minnesota (and the business relevant to
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this case, writing the policies, was done in Wisconsin, not
Minnesota), the contacts identified by the plurality had
nothing to do with Minnesota's purposes in permitting
coverages to be stacked. Id. at 337-40 (Powell, J., dissenting).
i. In other words, Minnesota had contacts with the case,
but none of them created Minnesota interests in having its
rule rather than Wisconsin's applied - none was "significant" in relation to the particular laws in conflict.
ii. Thus the constitutional limitation on choice of law
seems to boil down to whether the application of the particular law is "fundamentally unfair," and that standard
will almost never be met when a party does interstate
business and has contacts that are foreseeable in the other
state. See id. at 320.
e. Of course, Hague's potential force may be underestimated. For example, the Eighth Circuit has struck down
an application of Missouri law to a case on the ground
that the Missouri contacts were constitutionally insignificant. In McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d
578 (8th Cir.), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 1071 (1981), the
plaintiff had been hired in Missouri in 1956 and had accepted a transfer to the defendant's North Carolina plant
in 1970.
i. In 1975, he was again promoted and transferred to the
company's Milwaukee headquarters, but a dispute arose
over this transfer, and he was fired. He then returned to
Missouri and there sued the company for breach of contract. In that suit he included a claim that his termination
was in violation of a Missouri service-letter statute.
ii. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff on the serviceletter claim, the Eighth Circuit noted, first, that the postoccurrence change of residence to Missouri was, by itself,
not a sufficient contact, under Hague, to permit the application of Missouri law. 649 F.2d at 583. Second, the court

HeinOnline -- 10 ALI-ABA Course Materials J. 48 1985-1986

1985

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONFLICTS OF LAWS

49

treated each of the promotions and moves as under a new
contract, so the firing in Milwaukee was not related to the
1956 Missouri contract.
iii. Thus Missouri had only the one, insignificant contact
and could not apply its service-letter law to the case without infringing on Wisconsin interests and denying the defendant due process. 649 F.2d at 583-84. The decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court without opinion. 454 U.S.
1071 (1981).
2. If, however, situations like McCluney will be rare, choosing a
forum can be particularly important in planning litigation.
And the number of possible forums has been increasing over
most of the past 40 years, since there has been an expansion
of jurisdiction paralleling that in choice of law. International
Shoe, with its "minimum contacts" test, spawned McGee,
Mullane, and the long arm statutes. InternationalShoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); McGee v. Int'l Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
a. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has tightened up
somewhat on jurisdiction. Although the Court's opinions
only hinted at it, this tightening appears to have been
partly in response to choice-of-law developments. See,
e.g., Hill, Choice of Law and jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960, 960-61 (1981); Silberman,
Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation?: Federal
Choice-of-Law ConstraintsAfter Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103, 103 (1981).
i. Rather than controlling a state's application of its own
law directly, the Court has protected out-of-state defendants from the imposition of the forum's law by precluding
the exercise of jurisdiction.
b. The Court has taken two tacks in tightening up on jurisdiction. First, it has applied the minimum-contacts test to
all exercises of jurisdiction, not just those traditionally described as in personam. Furthermore, the Court has said
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that the relevant minimum contacts are those between the
forum and the defendant; it will not suffice, as some
courts had thought, simply to find contacts between the
forum and the plaintiff.
. Thus, in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the
Court held that the presence of the defendant's property
in the forum was not, by itself, sufficient basis to adjudicate a claim unrelated to that property. And the Court in
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), held that even the
combination of the defendant's insurance policy and the
plaintiff's residence in the forum were insufficient when
the claim related to an out-of-state accident.

ii. Rush, which struck down the Seider procedure used by
a few states to obtain jurisdiction over nonresidents, is an
example of the Court's indirect control over choice of law:
Minnesota, the forum, apparently would have applied its
own law regarding the statute of limitations, host-guest
liability, and contributory negligence, even though, at the
time of the Indiana accident, both parties were Indiana
residents. See 444 U.S. at 322 & n.2, 325 n.8; Seider v.

Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1966).
c. The second tack followed by the Court in tightening-up
regarding jurisdiction has been a renewed emphasis on the
question whether the party to be bound has purposefully
availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

i. Thus, in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98
(1978), a New York father was held not amenable to a
California custody proceeding instituted by the mother
who had moved to that state. The father had no contacts
of his own with California, and the Court said he had not
purposefully availed himself of its benefits and protections
when he sent his children out there so that they could stay
with their mother.
ii. The "purposefully availing" test was also important in
the decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
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son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In that case, the Court struck
down Oklahoma's exercise of long arm jurisdiction over
New York defendants who had sold an allegedly defective
car in New York. Although it was foreseeable in some
sense that the car would injure people in Oklahoma, the
Court held that the defendants had structured their business so as not to be relying on Oklahoma's benefits and
protections. See id. at 297-98.
iii. Once again, it is possible that the Court was protecting the defendants from choice-of-law rules that would
apply the forum's law. Compare id. at 292 (the minimum
contacts test "acts to ensure that the States, through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system") with id. at 311 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (implying that, in this case, permitting the Oklahoma forum
would not also "[impose] on the defendant an unfavorable
substantive law which the defendant could justly have assumed would not apply").
d. A hint that the Court might retreat from even its indirect,
personal-jurisdiction approach to limiting choice of law
was given in Insurance Corp. of I. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). Responding to
Justice Powell's concurrence, the Court denied that the
due process limitations on personal jurisdiction serve any
federalism concerns. Id. at 709. Rather, they protect only
an individual liberty interest. Accord, Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 n.13 (1985).
i. Thus the Court appears to have rejected the notion implicit in World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, that due process
limits on personal jurisdiction can be used to keep Oklahoma from applying its law in derogation of New York's
sovereignty. But see Home v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d
255, 259 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982).
ii. The retreat from personal jurisdiction limitations on
choice of law was also apparent in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S.Ct. 1473 (1984). The court of appeals,
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in striking down New Hampshire's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nationally-distributed magazine in a defamation action, emphasized the state's uniquely long
statute of limitations and the unfairness, in those circumstances, of allowing recovery for alleged injuries largely
suffered elsewhere. 682 F.2d 33, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1982).
iii. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the minimum-contacts question remained whether the defendant
could "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in the
forum; and there was no unfairness in calling a publisher
of a nationwide publication aimed at a nationwide audience "to answer for the contents of the publication wherever a substantial number of copies are regularly sold and
distributed." 104 S.Ct. at 1481-82. To introduce the first
amendment concerns regarding defamation actions at the
jurisdictional stage "would be a form of double counting,'
as they are already taken into account in the limitations
on the substantive law. See also Calder v. Jones, 104 S.Ct.
1482, 1487-88 (1984).
iv. The Court's latest personal jurisdiction decision,
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985),
makes it explicit that defendants will not be protected
against unfair substantive law by limitations on jurisdiction. In holding that a Michigan franchise was subject to
process from a federal court in Florida, the franchisor's
home, Justice Brennan wrote that
where a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render
jurisdiction unreasonable. Most such considerations usually may be
accommodated through means short of finding jurisdiction unconstitutional. For example, the potential clash of the forum's law with the
"fundamental substantive social policies" of another State may be accommodated through application of the forum's choice-of-law rules.
105 S. Ct. at 2185 (citing Allstate v. Hague).

v. Further, in discussing the consequences of a choice-oflaw clause in the franchise contract, the opinion noted
that
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[t]he Court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) and subsequent
cases has emphasized that choice-of-law analysis - which focuses on
all elements of a transaction, and not simply on the defendant's conduct - is distinct from minimum-contacts jurisdictional analysis which focuses at the threshold solely on the defendant's purposeful
connection to the forum. 105 S. Ct. at 2174 (emphasis in original;
footnote omitted).

3. The Supreme Court has also struck a blow against forum
shopping by making forum non conveniens dismissals easier
to obtain in federal court. The decision in PiperAircraft Co.
.v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), held that litigation convenience is the principal concern in deciding a forum non conveniens motion and that the substantive law that would be
applied should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even
substantial weight in the inquiry.
a. As a limitation on forum shopping, the Reyno decision
will be effective in relatively few cases.
i. In the first place, it is only an application of federal
law, not constitutional doctrine, and is thus not binding
upon the states.
ii. Second, and more significant, even within the federal
court system, few conflicts cases involve non-United States
contacts. Therefore, most changes of venue will be pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (transfer for the convenience of
parties or witnesses, in the interests of justice), rather than
by a forum non conveniens dismissal.
iii. At least when the defendant seeks the section 1404(a)
transfer, it is settled law that the transferee district will
apply the law of the district from which it receives the
case, including the transferor's choice-of-law rules. Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at 243 n.8; Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). See generally Ellis
v. Great Southwestern Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1107-11 (5th
Cir. 1981), for a discussion of the law applicable in other
transfer situations.
iv. Thus, in most cases, the plaintiff will be able to retain
the benefits of its choice of even an inconvenient forum.
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F. Recent Developments
1. On June 26, 1985, the Supreme Court handed down an important decision dealing with both personal jurisdiction and
choice-of-law issues. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts 105 S.
Ct. 2965 (1985), was a class action brought in Kansas state
court against Phillips, a natural gas producer, to recover interest on royalty payments that had been delayed by Phillips.
a. The class certified consisted of 33,000 royalty owners, who
were residents in all 50 states, the District of Columbia,
and several foreign countries; the royalties related to leases
in 11 states.
i. Notwithstanding the fact that over 99 per cent of the
leases and 97 per cent of the plaintiff class members had
no apparent connection to Kansas except for the lawsuit,
the Kansas courts adjudicated the claims of all the class
members and applied Kansas law to every claim, finding
Phillips liable to all class members for interest on the delayed royalty payments.
b. The Supreme Court held that the absent plaintiff class
members were not denied due process by the adjudication
of their claims without their participation.
i. Citing Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 & n.10 (1982), the
Court reaffirmed that the Due Process Clause limits personal jurisdiction to protect the "personal liberty interest"
of those whose property rights are to be affected by the
litigation. 105 S. Ct. at 2973.
ii. Because the "burdens placed by a State upon an absent
class-action plaintiff are not of the same order or [sic?]
magnitude as those it places upon an absent defendant,"
however, due process does not require that class-action
plaintiffs have the same "minimum contacts" with the forum. Id.
c. The Court held that to receive due process, class action
plaintiffs are entitled only to the following:
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i. The best practicable notice, "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, 399 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950);
ii. An opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, in person or through counsel;
iii. An opportunity to remove themselves from the class
by executing and returning an "opt out" or "request for
exclusion" from the court; and
iv. Adequate representation of their interest at all times
by the named plaintiff. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
42-43, 45 (1940); 105 S. Ct. at 2975.
d. On the choice-of-law issue, however, the Court held that
the application of Kansas law to all the claims violated the
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses. Id. at
2981.
i. The test of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 31213 (plurality opinion), 332 (Powell, J., dissenting), was
again held to be controlling: "[F]or a State's substantive
law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that state must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 105 S. Ct. at 2979.
ii. Unlike Allstate, though, the Court gave little emphasis
to the defendant's conducting substantial business in the
forum; rather, the focus was apparently on the locations of
the plaintiffs and the leases in question.
iii. Factors cited by the Kansas Supreme Court - a
"common fund" in Kansas, the plaintiffs' "consent" to the
application of Kansas law by not opting out - were summarily rejected, as was the argument that a court adjudi-
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cating a nationwide class action had much greater latitude
in applying its own law than might otherwise be the case.
Id. at 2979-81.
iv. The Court's repeated citations to Justice Powell's dissent in Allstate (he did not participate in Phillips) suggest
that it may not again be willing to countenance a forum's
applying its own law when its contacts are as tenuous as
they were in that case. At the same time, the Phillips decision, with its remand for "further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion," gives no clear indication what
contacts or factors are to be treated as significant in determining whether a choice of law is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 2981.
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